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Abstract 
Behavioural finance models suggest that under uncertainty, investors overweight their private 
information and overreact to it. We test this theoretical prediction in an M&A framework. We 
find that under high information uncertainty, when investors are more likely to possess firm-
specific information, acquiring firms generate highly positive and significant gains following 
the announcement of private stock and private cash acquisitions (positive news) while the 
market heavily punishes public stock (negative news) deals. On the other hand, under 
conditions of low information uncertainty, when investors do not possess private information, 
the market reaction is complete (i.e. zero abnormal returns) irrespective of the type of 
acquisition. Overall, we provide empirical evidence that shows that information uncertainty 
plays a significant role in explaining short-run acquirer abnormal returns. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper introduces a behavioural framework for merger and acquisitions (M&As) and 
investigate announcement acquirer returns in an environment of information uncertainty and 
private information
1
. This empirical research study is motivated by the theoretical 
behavioural finance models of Daniel et al. (1998, 2001). More specifically, theory pertains 
that if an investor trades on private signals and at a later stage a public signal confirms his/her 
initial private information, then his/her confidence rises. Hence, the literature conjectures that 
even if an individual initially does not suffer from any bias, a supporting public signal of their 
private information will contribute to higher levels of overconfidence leading to an 
overreaction, consistent with psychological evidence of confirmation bias impacting decision 
making (Klayman and Ha, 1987; Jonas et al., 2001). Evidence shows that this initial 
overreaction is corrected and reversed in the long run as further public signals drive prices 
back towards their fundamental level. Hirshleifer (2001) and Zhang (2006) show that the 
psychological bias of overconfidence
2
 increases under conditions of information uncertainty 
when the firm’s value is difficult to estimate. Furthermore, Zhang (2006) empirically shows 
that under conditions of uncertainty, good (bad) news generates relatively higher (lower) 
abnormal returns while when uncertainty is low, there is less market predictability. It is 
intuitive to believe that there should therefore be an impact of investor uncertainty on 
acquirer returns. 
We employ the above theoretical and empirical predictions in an M&A framework 
contributing with an alternative perspective of how information uncertainty can affect 
acquirer abnormal returns. It is agreed that acquisition announcements convey information to 
                                                          
1
 By private information, we refer to information collected by individual investors based on personal research. 
We employ synchronicity as a proxy for private information. An extensive discussion is provided in Section 3.3. 
By information uncertainty, we adopt the terminology of Zhang (2006) and refer to ambiguity of new 
information regarding the firm value. This ambiguity emanates from the volatility of firm’s underlying 
fundamentals. 
2
 Investor sentiment is used as an alternative term of investor overconfidence. 
the public market, principally signalling positive or negative news regarding the intrinsic 
value of the acquiring firm. In particular, there is substantial evidence (Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Travlos, 1987; Chang, 1998; Draper and Paudyal, 2006) that suggests that the target 
firm’s listing status and the payment method used signal different information concerning the 
valuation conditions of the acquiring firm. For instance, Travlos (1987) suggests that 
investors will perceive the announcement of a stock offer for a public target as bad news 
since the market infers that the acquiring firm is likely to be overvalued leading to a lower re-
evaluation. On the other hand, Chang (1998) suggests that when we control for the listing 
status of the target, then positive information can be relayed to the market if a private target is 
to be acquired using stock given typical ownership characteristics of such firms that indicate 
the potential creation of a blockholder in the combined firm (something that is argued to 
provide an incentive for the private target to ensure the stock is not overvalued). Hence 
private stock acquisitions would lead to a greater re-evaluation of the acquirers’ share price. 
While this has been unanimously agreed upon, little has been studied over the influence of 
information uncertainty upon investor reactions to M&A announcements. Financial markets 
are rife with uncertainty. Rumours over potential merger activity filter into markets on a daily 
basis, and with Shiller (2003) arguing that animal spirits are playing a growing role in 
security returns, the investor impact of uncertainty is clearly becoming of increasing 
importance to understand. 
In the context of M&A, we propose that acquirer returns are likely to be exaggerated at 
times when the firm is subject to information uncertainty. Following previous theory, 
investors trading under uncertainty are expected to overreact and generate highly positive 
(negative) abnormal returns following the announcement of private stock (public stock) 
acquisitions which convey positive (negative) signal to the market. On the other hand, in the 
absence of information uncertainty, it is expected no market reaction. 
We study the UK market as it is one of the largest capital market and one of the most 
active M&As countries. Faccio and Masulis (2005) document that UK acquirers account for 
65.3% of all European deals, while the UK is the second most-active takeover market in the 
world aside from the US. Together, these reflect our motivations to study the UK market. 
Methodologically, we capture information uncertainty using four well-known proxies, 
including: age, size, number of analyst and trading volume. To test whether investors are 
more likely to possess private information or not, we also employ stock price synchronicity 
as introduced by Roll (1988) and further developed by both Morck et al. (2000) and Chen et 
al. (2007). Roll (1988) suggests that a low R
2
 value should be observed in periods of no 
public news about the firm, indicating that the price movement is triggered by private 
information. Chen et al. (2007) among others
3
 adopt synchronicity as a measure of stock 
price informativeness and show that there is a strong positive relationship between the 
amount of private information within stock prices and the sensitivity of corporate investment 
to stock prices. Roll (1988) claims that the measure of stock price nonsynchroncity is not 
correlated with public information and thereby serves as a good approach to capture private 
information. In Roll’s own words, ‘‘the financial press misses a great deal of relevant 
information generated privately’’ (Roll, 1988: 564). 
The results suggest that under conditions of high information uncertainty and when 
investors are more likely to possess private information, announcements of takeovers which 
signal positive news for the acquiring firm’s intrinsic value (i.e. private stock deals) generate 
highly positive abnormal returns while takeovers which convey negative news (i.e. public 
stock) suffer high losses. On the other hand, when uncertainty is lower and investors are 
likely to possess private information (high synchronicity), zero economical and statistical 
abnormal returns are obtained irrespective of the type of the deal. Specifically, while previous 
                                                          
3 Morck et al. (2000), Durnev et al. (2003), Durnev et al. (2004), Jin and Myers (2006), Fernades and Ferreira (2008), 
Ferreira et al. (2011)) have used stock price nonsynchronicity to examine price informativeness. 
literature (Travlos, 1987; Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002) reports positive (around about 
+2%) abnormal returns for private stock deals and negative (around about -2%) abnormal 
returns for public stock deals, we show that this picture is magnified under conditions of 
uncertainty and is overblown when we control for private information as well. On the other 
hand there is no market reaction (zero abnormal returns) when investor sentiment triggered 
by uncertainty is low. In other words, uncertainty seems to act as magnifying glass which 
‘magnifies’ the initial picture of the overall sample and prior evidence. These findings are 
consistent across all four proxies used to capture uncertainty. Buy-Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHARs) 48 months post the announcement of the takeover indicate a reversal in the long-
run, further supporting that the initial announcement performance was driven by overreaction 
and investor sentiment. 
This paper contributes to the corporate and behavioural finance literature in several ways. 
First, this is the first paper to our knowledge that applies information uncertainty and private 
information (as measured using synchronicity) in an empirical M&A framework, thereby 
offering a behavioural approach in explaining short-run acquirer gains. Previous studies 
assume that the market is semi-strong efficient and short-run acquirer gains captures either 
potential synergy or revaluation gains. We offer evidence that the findings of Travlos (1987) 
and Chang (1998) may be driven by high investor sentiment. Second, this paper contributes 
to the behavioural finance literature by empirically examining the propositions of Daniel et 
al. (1998). Third, it shows that in the absence of the signalling effect public stock acquisitions 
are not value destructive investment decisions. Finally, it offers further evidence that the 
market reacts asymmetrically following the announcement of positive and negative signals. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents research design 
and develops the research question; Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 
analyses the empirical findings before Section 5 summarizes the conclusions of the 
investigation. 
 
2. Research Design and Testable Hypotheses 
2.1 Acquisitions Re-evaluation Effect 
The method of payment used to finance the transaction; along with the public/listing 
status of the target firm are of the major deal characteristics that can help to explain 
acquirers’ announcement performance. Derived from the seminal work of Myers and Majluf 
(1984), the signalling literature suggests that managers who believe that their firm’s stock 
price is undervalued will prefer to finance a potential acquisition with cash while when they 
consider that their stock price is overvalued, they will prefer to conduct equity transactions to 
capitalize upon this overvaluation
4
. Travlos (1987) suggests that investors will perceive the 
announcement of an equity offer for a public target as bad news leading to lower re-
evaluation of the acquirers’ share price. Takeovers are major corporate events that convey 
information regarding the prospects and managerial views of the firm value to the market. In 
this way, the private information of the manager enters the public spectrum of the market at 
the time of an acquisition announcement, predominantly via the manager’s financing choice. 
Conversely, Chang (1998), and Draper and Paudyal (2006) report a positive market 
reaction to the acquisition of private targets to be financed using equity. In these 
circumstances whereby the target firm is privately held, investors interpret such 
announcements as good news and this for several reasons. Primarily, unlisted firms tend to be 
owned by a small number of owners and hence these individuals are portrayed as having a 
stronger incentive to carefully examine the true value of the acquirers stock. If they believe it 
to be overvalued, then it would be an irrational act for these owners to accept the acquirer’s 
                                                          
4
 Shleifer and Vishny (2003) provide a model in which acquisitions are driven by firm-misvaluation. They 
support the idea that overvaluation provides an incentive to acquire a less overvalued target using equity.   
equity as payment for their firm. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the owner of the 
privately held firm will accept stock if they believe it to be overvalued as they will effectively 
‘lose-out’. Considering this, private stock acquisitions can be classified as positive 
announcements given the acceptance of the acquirer’s stock by the unlisted target, relaying a 
signal to the market that the acquirer’s stock price must not be overvalued leading to a greater 
re-evaluation of the acquirer’s share price. A cash acquisition for a private firm is usually 
considered a positive announcement as well but in truth, such an event does not reveal a lot of 
information regarding the acquirer’s intrinsic value in this setting. A reasonable assertion to 
make is that an acquirer paying for an unlisted target with cash may be less uncertain 
regarding the level of potential synergy gains that can be extracted from the proposed 
combination and as such is confident enough to offer cash. This loosely infers that the 
acquirer is confident, as they may be motivated to avoid the issuance of equity so as to avoid 
sharing potential synergy gains with the ownership of the target firm
5
. Therefore, a cash 
acquisition does not directly reveal information about the acquirer’s stock value but can, in 
general, be classified as a relatively positive piece of information. 
 
 
2.2 Behavioural Finance Models 
Honing in on behavioural finance, there is a plethora of literature that continues to grow 
in both popularity and size. Of late, research interests have typically centred on the resultant 
effects of information uncertainty. This paper takes note of this rising school of thought and 
offers a behavioural perspective to help explain short-term acquirer abnormal returns, a topic 
which has attracted much debate (Chang, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Bouwman et al., 
                                                          
5
 The issue of equity to an unlisted target’s owners would result in the creation of blockholders in the combined 
entity.  
2009). Experimental evidence shows that investors tend to overestimate the precision of their 
information, especially in cases where they have been personally involved in the collection of 
this information (Odean, 1999)
6
. Daniel et al. (1998) support this prediction and suggest that 
investors are overconfident about the private information they hold. When this private 
information is confirmed by a public signal, then these investors become more confident and 
overreact to it. 
Additionally, Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) also claim that investors become even more 
overconfident under conditions of information uncertainty. A large part of the psychology 
literature
7
 suggests that individuals overvalue their own abilities in the decision making 
process whilst also overestimating the precision of the outcome of the decision made
8
. 
Investors undoubtedly extract information from various sources (for example, from financial 
statements, the press and rumours amongst others). However, if they overestimate their own 
ability to extract this information, or they overweight the precision and significance of this 
information, then the resultant effect will be an overreaction due to the underestimation of the 
forecast error involved in the decision-making process. Daniel et al. (1998) define 
overconfident investors as those who overestimate the precision of their private information 
as opposed to the public signals available. They find that overconfident investors who possess 
private information will overweight this information, leading to a stock price overreaction. 
When an investor trades on his/her private information/signals and subsequently receives a 
public signal that serves to confirm the trading strategy being executed, then the investor’s 
confidence will rise. One of the advantages of the model of Daniel et al. (1998) when 
                                                          
6
 Odean (1999) claims that there is excessive trading in equity markets. He explains this as a result of investors 
who are overconfident. Markets, in turn, become affected by this psychological bias as investors inevitably trade 
a lot because they repeatedly feel the gains they earn are not enough. Interestingly, securities purchased by 
overconfident investors are found to underperform those they sell supporting that overconfidence destroys value 
and leads to excessive trading volumes.   
7
 See, for example, Griffin and Tversky (1992), Greenwald (1980), Svenson (1981), Cooper et al. 1988, Taylor 
and Brown (1988). 
8
 Hirshleifer (2001) suggests that psychological biases grow both under conditions of greater uncertainty, in the 
absence of accurate feedback about fundamentals.  
compared to previous behavioural models
9
 is that it assumes that investors become 
overconfident about private signals and therefore allows for both over- and under-reaction 
effects. Furthermore, the authors claim that since the model is mainly based on both private 
information and subsequent under or overreaction, its predictive power will be more evident 
for firms with higher information uncertainty. 
Zhang (2006) also suggests that investor overreaction should be more prominent under 
conditions of information uncertainty since investors become more overconfident for firms 
that are hard to value. He finds that under conditions of information uncertainty, 
announcements of good news generate relatively higher abnormal returns while 
announcements of bad news generate relatively lower abnormal returns. While Zhang (2006) 
controls only for information uncertainties, he does not include private information into his 
analysis, proposing that further investigation is required. 
 
2.3 Our Framework and Testable Hypotheses 
In this paper, we test the theoretical predictions of the behavioural models within a M&A 
framework. More specifically, we empirically investigate the acquirer announcement market 
reaction for the various types of takeovers under conditions of information uncertainty and 
private information. To capture information uncertainty, we employ four different proxies 
used in the literature such as age, size, analysts and trading volume. Young, small, low 
trading volume and/or acquiring firms followed by a small number of analysts are more likely 
to be subject to information uncertainty. For private information, we employ an established 
measure, namely synchronicity, introduced by Roll (1988). The lower the co-variation of the 
acquiring firm’s share price with the market and/or industry index, the more likely it is that 
                                                          
9
 Kyle and Wang (1997), Odean (1999) and Wang (1998) define overconfidence as overestimation of 
information precision regardless of whether the information is private or public. 
the acquiring firm’s share price will be moving due to firm-specific rather than market-wide 
information. 
Following this discussion above, we form the following predictions: 
Prediction 1: For acquires subject to high information uncertainty i.e. young, small, low 
trading volume and/or acquirers followed by a small number of analysts and for which 
investors are more likely to possess private information i.e. low synchronicity, the market is 
expected to overreact positively following the announcement of acquisitions of private targets 
paid for with equity or cash. 
Prediction 2: For acquires subject to high information uncertainty i.e. young, small, low 
trading volume and/or acquirers followed by a small number of analysts and for which 
investors are more likely to possess private information i.e. low synchronicity, the market is 
expected to overreact negatively following the announcement of acquisitions of public targets 
paid for with equity. 
Under high information uncertainty conditions (i.e. young, small, low trading volume 
and/or acquirers followed by a small number of analysts) and when investors are more likely 
to possess private information (i.e. low synchronicity stocks), investors are more likely to 
overreact upon the announcement of a takeover deal. Investors will overreact and generate 
highly positive abnormal returns following the announcement of acquisitions which signal 
‘good’ news – i.e. private targets financed with cash or stock, and public targets financed 
with cash. Under the same conditions, the market reaction will be highly negative following 
announcements of takeovers which signal ‘bad’ news – i.e. public targets paid for with stock. 
Prediction 3: For acquires subject to low information uncertainty i.e. old, large, high trading 
volume and/or acquirers followed by a large number of analysts and for which investors are 
less likely to possess private information i.e. high synchronicity, the market reaction is 
expected to be complete (zero abnormal returns) following the announcement of any 
acquisition, irrespective of the target’s public status (private or public) or the method of 
payment (cash or stock). 
When information uncertainty conditions are expected to be low (i.e. old, large, high 
trading volume and/or acquirers followed by a large number of analysts) coupled with 
investors who are less likely to have collected private information (i.e. high synchronicity), 
then the market reaction is expected to be complete (i.e. zero abnormal returns). 
 
3. Sample Selection, Data and Methodology 
3.1 The Sample 
The sample consists of takeover announcement deals undertaken by UK acquiring firms 
for the period between 01/01/1985 and 31/12/2008. The announcement dates for each deal 
were sourced from Thomson Security Data Corporations (SDC). For inclusion into the final 
sample, the following deal criteria was set:  
o The acquirer is a U.K. firm publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) with 
five days of return data available around the announcement date of the takeover as well 
as available data for three years Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) from the 
DataStream database. 
o The target company is either a listed or private company and can be a domestic or a 
foreign company. 
o The acquisition is financed by either 100% equity or 100% cash. 
o The acquiring firm purchases at least 50% of the target’s shares. 
o The deal value is ₤1 million or more. 
o The deal value represents at least 1% of the market value of the acquirer. 
o Multiple deals announced within a 5 day period are excluded. 
The initial sample from Thomson One Banker was 20,306 deals and after the exclusion 
of deals according to the above criteria, our final sample totaled 1,839 deals. Of these deals, 
1,409 were for takeovers of private targets and 430 were for public firms. Our study focuses 
especially on Private Stock and Public Stock which signal the strongest positive and negative 
signals respectively. 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the final sample. The median age of 
acquirers is around 12.97 years and the median size of acquirers is around 170.17 million 
pounds. Half of the acquirers are followed by 4 or more analysts and the median deal size of 
our sample is 12.75, inferring that around half of the deals conducted have are between £1 
and £12.75 million in size. In addition, the relative size of the target firm over that of the 
acquirer is 8.22% indicating that target firm are quite relative sizeable and would have a 
significant impact on acquirers. Panel B reports that diversified and non-diversified 
transactions are evenly distributed while domestic acquisitions slightly exceed cross-border 
ones. Panel C reports the number and percentage of acquirers per industry. The Other & 
Unclassified describes data that for which no data is provided by DataStream or SDC as well 
as financials and utilities. Since this is a study with a behavioural approach, we had no 
particular reason to exclude those deals. This information is not directly influential over our 
analysis in regards to the key research objectives of this paper and thus they remain in the 
sample.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2 Measures of Information Uncertainty 
In order to capture information uncertainty, we employ four proxies recommended 
within the literature. The first measure employed is Age. The existing literature suggests that 
the younger the firm is, the higher the amount of uncertainty there will be regarding the 
firm’s value (Zhang, 2006; Jiang et al., 2005; Barry and Brown, 1985). Young firms are 
associated with a lower amount of information dissemination and thus the age of the firm can 
be used as a proxy for the level of information uncertainty surrounding its value. We measure 
age as the difference between the date of incorporation of the firm and the date of the 
announcement of the acquisition. 
Size is the second proxy employed in order to capture information uncertainty 
regarding the acquirer’s value. Smaller firms are less likely to disclose a lot of information 
and are less diversified than larger firms. However, small firms also have a lower number of 
suppliers, investors and customers and therefore the accessibility of information can be more 
difficult. Hence, small size firms are more likely to be associated with a higher degree of 
information uncertainty (Zhang, 2006). We measure size as the Market Value (MV) of the 
acquiring firm 20 days before the announcement of the acquisition. 
Analyst Coverage is the third proxy used to capture information uncertainty. The role 
of analysts is to collect, analyze and distribute information about the company’s performance. 
The lower the number of analysts following a firm, the smaller the amount of available 
information about the specific firm. Zhang (2006) and Hong et al. (2000) use this approach as 
a measure of information uncertainty. Analyst coverage is measured as the number of analyst 
following the acquiring firm the year prior to the announcement of the acquisition. Firm 
followed by less than two analysts are classified as subject to high information uncertainty 
while those followed by two or more are classified as low information uncertainty acquirers. 
Trading Volume is the fourth proxy used within this work to measure information 
uncertainty. Low trading volumes suggest that a lower number of investors are aware or are 
following the firm. Thus there is likely to be less trading activity associated with the acquirers 
who exhibit a low trading volume. The trading volume of the acquirer is measured as the 
firm’s average daily trading volume scaled by the total number of shares outstanding six 
months prior to the announcement of the acquisition (Jiang et al., 2005). 
Table 2 reports the degree of correlation across all four proxies as well as 
synchronicity. Some of these measures are indeed positively correlated such as analyst 
coverage with Age or Size. However, other pairs, such as volume with age and/or analysts 
exhibit very low correlations. There is low correlation between synchronicity and age and 
volume proxies while it is higher for analysts and age. This is quite reasonable as the higher 
the number of analysts or the larger the firm, the higher the synchronicity. In other words, 
when more analysts follow a firm, they search and collect private information which they 
reveal and make it available to the public. Similarly, large firms are more exposed to the 
market. Hence, there is lower likelihood of investor to possess private information (higher 
synchronicity). 
In addition, Panel B of Table 2 presents the correlation matrix among the control 
variables employed in the multivariate analysis. Correlations seem to be relatively low. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.3 Measure of Private Information 
Recent models emanating from the school of behavioural finance have focused on the 
role of private information and its subsequent impact on investors’ cognitive biases alongside 
their following investment decisions. One of the roles of financial markets is to facilitate the 
production and accumulation of information into stock prices. This occurs through the impact 
of the trading activities of speculators on stock prices. Financial economists support the 
notion that stock returns incorporate firm-specific and market-wide information. Roll (1988) 
claims that stock prices move together depending on the amount of firm-specific or market-
wide information impounded in stock prices. He also explains that stock price movements are 
influenced by market-wide economic shocks, by industry shocks and by news specific to the 
firm. 
Chen et al. (2007) suggest that managers learn from the private information 
incorporated in stock prices and take advantage of this information within their corporate 
investment decisions. More specifically, they suggest that private information is incorporated 
in stock prices through speculators trading activity. An important point to note is that a high 
level of private information does not imply that stock prices are close to fundamentals. The 
variation between a stock price and its fundamental value depends on the amount of public 
information available for that stock as well. The incorporation of private information is a 
timely procedure and that may imply that stock prices with more private than public 
information might be further away from fundamentals. Theoretical evidence (Dow and 
Gorton, 1997; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999) suggests that managers can extract useful 
information hidden in stock prices. Stock prices accumulate information coming from various 
types of investors in the market via their trading activity. Consequently, stock prices may 
incorporate information that managers do not have. Different stocks have different levels of 
private information incorporated within them due to the various costs involved in the 
acquisition and production of such information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Ferreira and 
Laux (2007) argue that firms with fewer antitakeover provisions for which investors have a 
higher benefit to search for private information are associated with higher levels of 
idiosyncratic risk, trading activity and private information flow. 
This paper follows Chen et al. (2007) to measure stock price synchronicity. The 
variation of stock returns can be decomposed into the following components: market-wide 
variation, industry-specific variation and firm-specific variation. This work needs to capture 
the last component of firm-specific variation, which can be measured by the R
2
 of the 
following regression: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖,0+ 𝛽𝑖,𝑚 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑗 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡             (1) 
where ri,j,t is the return of acquirer i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t 
and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. To construct this regression, weekly returns for a 
period of 24 weeks (6 months) before the announcement of the acquisition are used. 
 
3.4 Short-Run Event Study Methodology 
To calculate the acquiring firms’ performance and identify the short-run impact of 
information uncertainty and private information, we employ standard event study 
methodology (Fuller et al., 2002) to calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for 
a five-day period (-2, +2)
10
 around the announcement date, as provided by DataStream. We 
estimate abnormal returns using the modified market model as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑅𝑚,𝑡             (2) 
Where ARi,t is the excess return of acquirer i on day t;  Ri,t is the return of acquirer i 
on day t measured as the percentage change in return index including dividends of acquirer i; 
and Rm,t is the market return estimated as the percentage change in FTSE All Share Index 
(value-weighted) on day t. The CARs are calculated as the sum of the Abnormal Returns 
(ARi,t) for the five days surrounding the announcement of the acquisition as per the following 
equation: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ (𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑚)             (3)
𝑡=+2
𝑡=−2
 
3.5 Long-Run Buy-Hold Abnormal Returns 
If the initial short-run market reaction to takeover announcements was driven by 
investor overreaction, a price correction should be observed in the long-run. To examine the 
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 We have conducted our analysis using a 3-day window (-1,+1) and the results remain consistent. 
long-run abnormal stock returns, we employ 48-month buy-and-hold abnormal return 
(BHAR) approach advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997). The BHAR is computed as: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
1
− ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)
𝑇
1
             (4) 
where Rit is the monthly return for company i and Rmt is the monthly return of the market 
index. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Acquirer Announcement Returns 
Table 3 reports the five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the full sample by 
the target’s listing status (i.e. private or public) and by the method of payment used to finance 
the deal (cash or stock). Acquirers which bid for private target firms enjoy positive and 
significant gains of 1.7% while for acquisitions of targets which are listed firms, acquirers 
suffer marginally insignificant losses of -0.40%. While the target listing status impacts the 
returns generated for acquiring firms, the signaling literature indicates that the method of 
payment used by the acquirer to finance the deal plays a significant role in determining the 
returns to be experienced. With respect to the method of payment used, acquisitions for 
private targets paid for with stock (3.80%) enjoy 2.60% (p-value: 0.017) significantly more 
abnormal returns than those paid for with cash (1.20%) (see Chang, 1998; Ang and Kohers, 
2001; Draper and Paudyal, 2006; and Fuller et al., 2002). On the other hand, takeovers for 
public target firms paid for with equity suffer significant losses (-2.50%) while those paid for 
with cash generate positive abnormal returns (1.10%). The difference of 3.60% is statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level (Travlos, 1987). We present these results for two 
reasons - firstly to show that the picture of the overall sample is consistent with the prior 
evidence reported in the literature and secondly, to show how the initial picture of the overall 
sample changes under the presence or absence of information uncertainty and private 
information. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Tables 4 reports the short-term performance of takeovers for private and public targets 
paid for cash and stock respectively (denoted PrivateCash, PrivateStock, PublicCash and 
PublicStock respectively) under conditions of information uncertainty as captured by four 
proxies and private information as captured by synchronicity. Panel A depicts announcement 
abnormal returns by employing the Age proxy to capture information uncertainty. The 
younger a firm is, the higher the level of uncertainty there is regarding the firms true value. 
As outlined earlier, Chang (1998) indicates that PrivateStock acquisitions serve as a positive 
news to the market that acquiring firm’s share price is not overvalued due to the target’s 
acceptance of the acquirer’s equity. The overall short-term performance of the PrivateStock 
portfolio is 3.80% (p-value: 0.000). Under conditions of information uncertainty, 
PrivateStock deals generate 4.40% abnormal returns, while, when private information is also 
incorporated (HiuLs), PrivateStock deals generate even stronger positive abnormal returns of 
5.70% (0.005) for the acquirer. On the other hand, under low information uncertainty, the 
market reaction is lower (2.40%), and when the private information of investors is likely to 
be lower, the market reaction is almost zero (0.60% insignificant gains). The difference of 
2.10% between High and Low information portfolios amplifies to 5.00% (statistically 
significant: p-value: 0.037) when private information is taken into account. This indicates that 
the market reaction is fundamentally different between the two states of uncertainty and 
consistent with the theoretical behavioural finance models. Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) suggest 
that investors tend to overweight their private information and become even more 
overconfident under conditions of information uncertainty. When private information is 
included, the overconfidence of the investor is likely to become even more intense so that the 
differences are expected to be amplified. This performance of Private stock deals under 
conditions of uncertainty seems to be almost 3 times more that the results reported in the 
literature (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002). On the other hand, in the absence of uncertainty 
and private information, private stock deals obtain marginally positive but insignificant 
abnormal returns (0.60%). That shows that when investors possess a level of private 
information, there is a highly positive reaction following the announcement of events that 
signal positive news about the acquiring firm’s intrinsic value. On the other hand, when 
investors are less likely to possess private information and thus have less potential to 
overestimate its precision, there is no significant market reaction. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The picture for private acquisitions paid with cash (PrivateCash) is similar to the one 
described above. PrivateCash deals also convey positive news to the market but less strong 
than that of PrivateStock deals. The difference between conditions of high versus low 
uncertainty is positive and significant but to a lower magnitude (1.60%). PublicCash deals 
seem not to convey neither positive nor a negative signal to the market. For that reason, we 
observe no economically or statistically significant difference between the two states of the 
market for PublicCash deals. The discussion will mainly focus on PrivateStock and 
PublicStock deals which convey strongly positive and negative signals respectively. 
The picture described above is different for acquisitions for public target firms paid 
for with equity (PublicStock). PublicStock acquisitions signal negative news to the market 
regarding the intrinsic value of the acquiring firm’s value. In the overall sample, PublicStock 
deals generate significantly negative losses of -2.50% (p-value: 0.000) for the acquiring firm. 
When we control for uncertainty, the negative performance becomes even more negative (-
3.30%) under conditions of high information uncertainty. When private information is also 
incorporated, the performance of PublicStock deals is even worse (-3.70%). On the other 
hand, it declines to -1.20% under low uncertainty and even lower to -1.00% (0.423) under 
lower information uncertainty and no private information. The difference between the two 
states of the market is 2.70% and statistically significant (p-value: 0.098). This evidence is 
also consistent with the theoretical behavioural finance models of Daniel et al. (1998, 2001). 
The market over-reaction leads PublicStock deals to even more negative short-run abnormal 
performance.  
The findings described above can be visualized in Figure 1. The first column of each 
group shows the cumulative abnormal returns for the overall sub-portfolios, which is 
consistent with existing empirical literature. The second column depicts the market reaction 
to takeover announcements when information uncertainty is high while the third column 
represents the cumulative abnormal returns for the portfolio in the absence of uncertainty and 
private information. It is clear that under conditions of uncertainty, there is a market 
overreaction. There is a highly positive reaction for positive-signaling deals (i.e. PrivateStock 
and PrivateCash) and a highly negative one for those takeovers signaling negative news (i.e. 
PublicStock). On the other hand, in the absence of uncertainty and private information, the 
market reaction is complete (i.e. zero abnormal returns), as displayed in the third column for 
each of the four sub-portfolios. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
For robustness, we conduct this analysis using a further three proxies, namely size, 
analysts and trading volume in order to capture information uncertainty. The results are 
provided in Panels B, C, and D respectively. The overall picture for the four types of 
acquisitions (i.e. PrivateStock, PrivateCash, PublicStock and PublicCash) remains highly 
similar to the evidence indicated by the age proxy and the findings remain consistent across 
all four proxies. 
The results for the overall portfolios are consistent with the evidence reported in the 
prior literature (Travlos, 1987; and Chang, 1998). When we allow for investor sentiment to 
enter the picture, we observe a positive (negative) overreaction following the announcement 
of positive (negative) signaling takeovers. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical 
work of Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) and Hirshleifer (2001). Zhang (2006) also reports similar 
evidence. He empirically shows that under conditions of uncertainty, good (bad) news 
generates relatively higher (lower) abnormal returns while when uncertainty is low, there is 
less market predictability. At this point, we need to make it clear that this paper does not 
argue that the whole acquirers’ announcement reaction is driven by behavioural biases. 
Synergies, timing and other factors may be determining factors in relation to the short-run 
quality of a takeover deal. This study investigates how the re-evaluation of the acquiring firm 
(positive or negative) is conveyed to the market through the announcement of acquisitions 
can be interpreted under conditions of high and low investor sentiment. 
Another important point to note is related to potential risk-based explanations for the 
results. One might argue that the proxies used to capture information uncertainty could also 
be used as risks factors. However, we feel our results fall more in line with the behavioural 
story presented in this paper rather with a neoclassical approach. Primarily, neoclassical 
explanations suggest that high risk acquirers should be associated with high returns. This is 
the case of PrivateStock, PrivateCash and PublicCash (positive signalling) acquisitions but 
exactly the opposite is observed for PublicStock (negative signalling) deals. For public stock 
deals, the higher the risk (uncertainty), the more negative the returns are. Therefore this 
finding gives additional support to the behavioural (uncertainty) story, rather with to the 
rational (risk) story. In addition, we control for the potential effects of risk by employing the 
Fama-French 3 factor model
11
. 
 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
The existing M&A literature has documented a number of different factors that can 
affect the performance of acquiring firms, such as book-to-market (Rau and Vermaelen, 
1998), relative size (Fuller et al., 2002. Croci et al., 2010), total assets, leverage, cash-to-
assets (Faccio and Masulis, 2005) and industry diversification (Doukas and Kan, 2004). 
To examine whether differences in acquirer and deal characteristics explain the 
abnormal return differentials, we adopt a multivariate regression framework whereby 
announcement period returns for acquirers are regressed against a set of explanatory variables 
that have been proven in the literature to affect acquirers’ performance. Moreover, the 
multivariate framework enables us to overcome issues related to the small number of 
observations in some portfolios
12
.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In all regressions we include the following control variables: the acquirer’s book-to-
market value, which is measured by the acquirer’s net book value of assets divided by its 
market value one month before the announcement of the deal; the deal’s relative size, which 
is measured as the ratio of the deal value over the acquirer’s value; the logarithmic form of 
acquirer’s total assets as measured the year prior to the acquisition announcement; Leverage 
is measured as acquirer’s long term debt divided by the market value of equity the year prior 
to the acquisition announcement; Cash-to-Assets is measures as acquirer’s cash prior to the 
year of the announcement scaled by its total assets; a dummy variable for diversifying deals 
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 The results of these examinations are not reported in this work but are available upon request, and simply 
serve to reinforce the results reported in Table 4. 
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 There are a relatively low number of acquisitions for public targets paid for with equity in the UK. 
which takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the 
target, and zero otherwise; and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target is a 
domestic firm. 
For brevity, we present the multivariate analysis only for PrivateStock and 
PublicStock deals which signal the most positive and negative news respectively. The results 
for PrivateCash and PublicCash deals follow similar patterns to the evidence discussed here 
for PrivateStock acquisitions. Panel A of Table 5 presents the results for the Age proxy. In 
regression (1), we include a dummy variable (High) that takes the value of one if the deal is 
classified as high uncertainty and zero otherwise, a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if a deal involves the acquisition of a private target financed by equity, and zero 
otherwise (PrivateStock), as well as an interactive variable of PrivateStock*High, which 
would capture the impact of information uncertainty on private stock deals. In all regressions, 
our focus is on the interactive variable. The interactive variable in regression (1) is positive 
and significant (0.024). In regression (2), we include a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the deal belongs in the high uncertainty and low synchronicity group (HiuLs), as well 
as an interactive variable of PrivateStock times HiuLs, which would capture the impact of 
states of information uncertainty and private information for private stock deals. When, along 
with information uncertainty, we incorporate private information in regression (2), the 
interactive variable becomes even more positive (0.036) and more significant, providing 
further support to the findings presented in the previous section. This finding remains robust 
when we proxy information uncertainty with other three proxies (see regressions (5), (6), (9), 
(10) and (13), (14) in Panels B, C and D respectively). Under uncertainty, investors 
overweight their private information and we observe a significant positive relationship 
between CARs and high levels of private information. A negative overreaction is observed in 
regressions (3), (7), (11) and (15) for PublicStock deals under high information uncertainty. 
The interactive dummy variable (PublicStock*High) carries a negative and significant 
coefficient, indicating that under conditions of information uncertainty, the market reacts 
even more negatively for public stock deals. In regressions (4), (8), (12) and (16), where we 
combine information uncertainty and private information, the interactive variable 
(PublicStock*HiuLs) becomes even more negative and significant. The results are robust 
among all four proxies for information uncertainty. The multivariate analysis offers 
supportive evidence to the conclusions drawn from the univariate analysis. In absolute term, 
the interactive variable for public stock acquisition is higher than that of private stock 
indicating an asymmetric response to positive and negative news. These finding is consistent 
with Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Bernard et al. (1997) find significant differences in 
the markets response with regards to receiving a signal of good and bad news. 
 
4.3 The Impact of Disclosure on Stock Price Synchronicity 
Throughout this paper, we follow the view of Roll (1988), among others, who claims that the 
measure of stock price nonsynchronicity is not correlated with public information and thereby 
serves as a good approach to capture private information. Synchronicity captures firm-
specific information. Given that for UK public firms (our sample of bidders), transparency 
and disclosure are more homogenous compared to other countries, we make the wider 
assumption that variation in stock price synchronicity is more likely to capture and be driven 
by private information collected by investors. Jin and Myers (2006) and Gul, Kim and Qiu 
(2010) argue that synchronicity is higher in less developed economies with poorer corporate 
governance. In such markets, synchronicity is likely to capture, apart from private 
information, public firm-specific information as well. 
Despite our initial assumption, for robustness reasons, we acknowledge that the 
measure of synchronicity may capture public firm-specific information. To deal with this 
issue, we construct a measure of disclosure to control for it. Vast financial accounting 
literature discusses disclosure and various measures that could proxy for it. We follow a UK 
study by Mouselli et al. (2012), who argue that accrual quality is positively associated with 
disclosure since firms with better-quality disclosure are less likely to engage in earnings 
management and therefore have higher accruals quality. 
To calculate Abnormal Working Capital Accruals (AWCA), we follow Marra et al. 
(2011). AWCA is calculated for each bidding firm at the end of the year before the 
announcement date as follows: 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝑊𝐶𝑡 − [(
𝑊𝐶𝑡−1
𝑆𝑡−1
) 𝑆𝑡] 
Where t is the year end before the acquisition announcement, AWCA is the Abnormal 
Working Capital Accrual WC is the non-cash working capital, calculated as Current Assets 
minus cash and short-term investments minus current liabilities plus short-term debt. S is 
Total Sales. AWCA is scaled by Total Assets.
13
 
To control for information emanating from the firm through various disclosure 
mechanisms, we regress the above disclosure measure on synchronicity and we keep the 
residual. The variation in synchronicity that cannot be explained by disclosure (public 
information) is more likely to represent private information. In this way, we create a cleaner 
measure of private information. In this section and in Table 6, we use this cleaner measure of 
synchronicity to capture private information. The results are robust and hold. Table 6 presents 
evidence similar to Table 5. Actually, our results become even stronger. The interactive 
variable for private stock deals (PrivStock*HiuLs) becomes even more positive and 
significant, while the interactive variable for public stock deals (PublicStock*HiuLs) 
becomes even more negative and significant, as compared to the regressions where we have 
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 We have tried different variations of this measure, such as not scaling by total assets, or by taking the absolute 
value of AWCA as in Marra et al. (2011) and the results are robust 
not incorporated private information (see Table 5 in the paper, regressions (1), (3), (5), (7), 
(9), (11), (13) and (15)), as well as compared to the regressions where we use raw 
synchronicity as a proxy of private information (see Table 5 in the paper, regressions (2), (4),  
(6), (8), (10), (12), (14) and (16)) 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.4 Long-Run Performance 
If this initial short-run market performance is driven by investor overreaction, as we 
argue so far, a long-run reversal should be observed in the long-run. Table 7 presents a 
multivariate analysis with exactly the same variables used in table 5 for Buy-Hold Abnormal 
Returns (BHARs) for 4 years (48 months) post the announcement of the takeover. Results 
show that the initial overreaction disappears and reverses in the long-run. The interactive 
coefficient for private stock deals becomes negative and significant for most proxies of 
information uncertainty. The same applies for public stock deals. The interactive coefficient 
for public stock deals becomes positive and significant in the long run indicating that the 
short-run negative overreaction is reversed. In unreported results, we test various post 
announcement event windows such as 3, 6 and 12 months as well as 2, 3 and 4 years. The 
results for the period up to 1 year show a price continuation (positive for private stock and 
negative for public stock deals) after the announcement date which disappears in year 2. 
There is weak evidence of reversal in year 3 and slightly stronger evidence of reversal in the 
reported results in Table 7. Our findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
Daniel et al. (1998) who argue that investors’ biases cause overreaction and momentum in 
stock prices which is finally reversed.  This picture reinforces our initial argument that a large 
part of the short-run announcement abnormal returns have been driven by investor 
overreaction. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the market response to the re-evaluation effect of takeover 
announcements. We adopt a behavioural approach within a UK sample set under conditions 
of information uncertainty and private information. More specifically, we examine the short-
term acquirer gains controlling for information uncertainty regarding the acquirer and the 
effects of the deal, as well as the level of the investor’s private information in the surrounding 
environment of the acquirer. 
The main findings suggest that under conditions of high information uncertainty and 
when investors are more likely to possess private information, announcements of takeovers 
which convey positive news concerning the acquiring firm’s intrinsic value (i.e. PrivateStock 
and PrivateCash deals) generate highly positive abnormal returns. Under the same conditions, 
takeovers which signal negative news (i.e. PublicStock) suffer high losses. On the other hand, 
when uncertainty is lower and investors are less likely to possess private information (i.e. 
high synchronicity), zero economical and statistical abnormal returns are obtained 
irrespective of the type of the deal undertaken. 
This evidence is consistent with the theoretical work of Daniel et al. (1998, 2001) who 
suggest that investors are overconfident and overreact to their private information following 
public announcements under conditions of uncertainty. Furthermore, they claim that 
investors, due to a self-attribution bias, become even more overconfident about their own 
private information following the public announcement and overreact even more. 
Consequently, under uncertainty, investors with private information react highly positively 
following the announcement of good news (i.e. PrivateCash, PrivateStock) while they react 
very negatively following the announcement of bad news (i.e. PublicStock deals). When 
there is low uncertainty and investors do not possess private information, the market reaction 
is complete.  
Overall, this paper offers a behavioural explanation for the market reaction following 
takeover announcement. Even after controlling for risk factors by employing the classical 
Fama-French 3 factor model, our results are robust and consistent with our behavioural 
explanations. The short-run market reaction to M&As announcements reflects either potential 
synergy and/or revaluation gains. Our evidence suggests that there is a market overreaction 
driven by investor biases. Investors’ biases increase especially with uncertainty and will also 
depend on the type of news conveyed by each type of takeover. Investors will react either 
highly positively or negatively with private information following a positive or negative news 
respectively. In the absence of uncertainty, the market reaction is complete. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
This figure illustrates the five days Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the PrivateStock, PublicStock, 
PrivateCash and PublicCash portfolios. The first bar of each group presents the overall performance 
of the portfolio. The second (grey) bar show the performance under high uncertainty-low 
synchronicity and the third (stripped) bar shows the performance under low uncertainty-high 
synchronicity. In this graph, information uncertainty is captured by the proxy of Age. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
 
Q1 Median Q2 
Age 4.33 12.97 28.19 
Size of Acquirer (MV) 41.7 170.17 785.6 
Analysts 1 4 10 
Volume 0.001 0.0025 0.005 
Size of Target (Deal Value) 3.885 12.75 45.404 
RS 0.024 0.082 0.339 
Market-to-Book Value 1.3 2.27 3.86 
Log(Total Assets) 4.54 5.13 5.81 
Leverage 3.88 67.56 204.94 
Cash to Assets 0.03 0.9 0.195 
Panel B: Acquisitions in the Same or Different Industry/Country 
  Number of Deals Percentage 
Diversifying 948 51.55% 
Non-Diversifying 891 48.45% 
Domestic 1132 61.55% 
Foreign 707 38.44% 
Total 1839 100.00% 
Panel C: Deals Per Industry 
Basic Materials 53 2.88% 
Telecommunications 18 0.98% 
Technology 210 11.42% 
Consumer Services 402 21.86% 
Consumer Goods 156 8.48% 
Industrials 642 34.91% 
Healthcare 88 4.79% 
Oil & Gas 49 2.66% 
Other & Unclassified 221 12.02% 
Total 1839 100.00% 
 
This table presents general descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A shows the first quartile, 
median and third quartile for the different variables. Age is measured as the difference between the 
incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. Size of acquirer is measured as 
the market capitalization (MV) of the acquiring firm 20 days before the announcement date of the 
deal. Analysts is measured as the number of analysts that follow the bidding firm in the year prior to 
the acquisition. Volume is measured as the number of shares traded scaled by the total number of 
shares, averaged on a daily basis over the 6 months prior to the acquisition announcement. The target 
firm size is measured by the deal value and the relative size (RS) of the deal, which is calculated as 
the ratio of the deal value of the acquirer’s market value. Acquirer’s market-to-book is measured by 
the acquirer’s market value a month before the announcement of the deal divided by its net book 
value of assets; a deal’s relative size is the ratio between target and acquirer size; the Log(Total 
Assets) is the logarithmic of acquirers total assets the year prior to the acquisition announcement; 
Leverage is measured as acquirer’s long term debt divided by the market value of equity the year prior 
to the acquisition announcement; Cash-to-Assets is measures as acquirer’s cash prior to the year of the 
announcement scaled by its total assets. 
Panel B shows the number and percentage of diversifying and non-diversifying acquisitions as well as 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions. If the first two digits of the SIC code of the acquiring firm is 
equal to the first two digits of the SIC code of the target firm, the deal is classified as non-
diversifying, otherwise as diversifying. Domestic deals are classified the ones for which both the 
bidder and the target firm are UK-based and cross-border if the target firm is located outside the UK. 
Panel C shows the number and percentage of deals by acquiring firm’s industry. 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix for Information Uncertainty Proxies 
 
Age Size Analysts Volume Synchronicity 
  Age 1.000     
  Size 0.370 1.000    
  Analysts 0.428 0.787 1.000   
  Volume 0.005 0.215 0.131 1.000  
  Synchronicity 0.224 0.523 0.471 0.145 1.000 
  Panel B: Correlation Matrix for Control Variables 
 
MTBV Relative Size Log(Total Assets) Leverage Cash-to-Assets Domestic Diversifying 
MTBV 1.000 
      Relative Size -0.022 1.000 
     Log(Total Assets) -0.019 -0.149 1.000 
    Leverage -0.037 0.114 0.085 1.000 
   Cash-to-Assets 0.056 0.149 -0.290 -0.122 1.000 
  Domestic -0.064 0.011 -0.232 0.049 -0.130 1.000 
 Diversifying -0.035 0.037 0.024 0.024 -0.025 -0.005 1.000 
This table presents the pairs of correlations between all five proxies (Panel A) and the control variables (Panel B). Age is measured as the difference between 
the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. Size is measured as the logarithm of market capitalization (MV) of the acquiring 
firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. Volume is measured as the number of shares traded scaled by the total number of shares, averaged on 
a daily basis over the 6 months prior to the acquisition announcement. Analysts is measured as the number of analysts that follow the bidding firm in the year 
prior to the acquisition. 
Acquirer’s market-to-book is measured by the acquirer’s market value a month before the announcement of the deal divided by its net book value of assets; a 
deal’s relative size is the ratio between target and acquirer size; the log(Total Assets) is the logarithm of acquirers total assets at the end of the year prior to 
the acquisition announcement; Leverage is measure as the acquirer’s long term debt scaled by its market value of equity; Cash to Assets is measured as 
acquirers cash and short term investments scaled by its total assets at the end of the year prior to the acquisition announcement; Domestic deals dummy takes 
the value of 1 for acquisitions of UK firms and zero otherwise; Diversifying deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code 
is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise. 
Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the Entire Sample 
 
All Stock Cash Dif (Stock-Cash) 
Private 0.017*** 0.038*** 0.012*** 0.026** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) 
N 1409 225 1184 
 Public -0.004 -0.025*** 0.011 -0.036*** 
 
(0.276) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
N 430 180 250 
 This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) surrounding the 
announcement for the entire sample. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted 
model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return 
(TOTMKUK). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively. The Dif (Stock-
Cash) represents the differences in mean CARs for the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition 
announcement of stock versus cash acquisitions. Stock is 100% equity financed acquisition and Cash is a 
100% cash financed acquisition. P-values are reported in brackets and the number of acquisitions for 
each category is reported below that. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of High and Low Uncertainty and High 
Uncertainty-Low Synchronicity (HiuLs) and Low Uncertainty - High Synchronicity (LiuHs) 
Acquirers by 4 proxies: Age, Size, Analysts, Trading Volume of the Acquiring Firm 
  Panel A: Age Panel B: Size 
  
Private 
Stock 
Public 
Stock 
Private 
Cash 
Public 
Cash 
Private 
Stock 
Public 
Stock 
Private 
Cash 
Public 
Cash 
All 0.038*** -0.025*** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.038*** -0.025*** 0.012*** 0.011** 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
N 225 180 1184 250 225 180 1184 250 
 
Information Uncertainty 
Hiu 0.044*** -0.033*** 0.017*** 0.014* 0.044*** -0.037*** 0.021*** 0.021** 
p-value (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.068) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) 
N 156 111 557 95 164 111 577 67 
Liu 0.024* -0.012 0.009*** 0.009* 0.023* -0.006 0.004** 0.007 
p-value (0.072) (0.184) (0.000) (0.075) (0.085) (0.560) (0.046) (0.135) 
N 69 69 625 155 61 69 606 183 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) 0.021 -0.021 0.008** 0.005 0.021 -0.031** 0.017*** 0.013 
p-value (0.275) (0.116) (0.044) (0.562) (0.262) (0.023) (0.000) (0.173) 
 
Information Uncertainty and Synchronicity 
HiuLs 0.057*** -0.037*** 0.022*** 0.014 0.050*** -0.040*** 0.024*** 0.026** 
p-value (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.172) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) 
N 99 65 324 49 118 74 394 45 
LiuHs 0.006 -0.010 0.006** 0.009* 0.007 -0.010 0.004* 0.010* 
p-value (0.661) (0.422) (0.011) (0.093) (0.616) (0.463) (0.090) (0.051) 
N 33 34 353 117 44 43 404 141 
(HiuLs-LiuHs) 0.050** -0.027* 0.016*** 0.006 0.044** -0.030* 0.020*** 0.016 
p-value (0.037) (0.098) (0.004) (0.627) (0.044) (0.085) (0.000) (0.170) 
  Panel C: Analysts Panel D: Volume 
  
Private 
Stock 
Public 
Stock 
Private 
Cash 
Public 
Cash 
Private 
Stock 
Public 
Stock 
Private 
Cash 
Public 
Cash 
All 0.037*** -0.028*** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.045*** -0.026*** 0.014*** 0.012** 
p-value (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.014) 
N 199 168 1132 236 170 134 996 217 
 
Information Uncertainty 
Hiu 0.046*** -0.040*** 0.026*** 0.004 0.051*** -0.033** 0.020*** 0.015* 
p-value (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.723) (0.008) (0.011) (0.000) (0.073) 
N 128 84 342 55 110 76 490 82 
Liu 0.020* -0.015* 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.034** -0.018 0.008*** 0.010* 
p-value (0.070) (0.098) (0.001) (0.008) (0.023) (0.103) (0.001) (0.090) 
N 71 84 790 181 60 58 505 135 
Dif(Hiu-Liu) 0.026 -0.025* 0.020*** -0.010 0.016 -0.015 0.011*** 0.005 
p-value (0.182) (0.076) (0.000) (0.401) (0.496) (0.385) (0.007) (0.628) 
 
Information Uncertainty and Synchronicity 
HiuLs 0.050** -0.041*** 0.030*** -0.002 0.063** -0.034** 0.026*** 0.012 
p-value (0.013) (0.004) (0.000) (0.880) (0.015) (0.028) (0.000) (0.331) 
N 91 56 234 25 73 50 308 43 
LiuHs 0.003 -0.019 0.005** 0.013** 0.015 -0.016 0.006** 0.011* 
p-value (0.836) (0.147) (0.040) (0.016) (0.410) (0.314) (0.047) (0.096) 
N 39 48 455 122 28 32 313 101 
(HiuLs-LiuHs) 0.047** -0.022 0.025*** -0.015 0.048 -0.018 0.020*** 0.001 
p-value (0.045) (0.243) (0.000) (0.352) (0.122) (0.416) (0.001) (0.932) 
This table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during five days (-2, +2) surrounding the 
announcement of High and Low information uncertainty as well as High information uncertainty-Low 
synchronicity (HiuLs) and Low information uncertainty-High synchronicity (LiuHs) acquirers by 
employing 4 proxies to capture information uncertainty for the acquirer. Synchronicity is measured as 
the R
2
 of the following regression: 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
where ri,j,t is the return of acquirer i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the 
return of industry j at time t. Abnormal returns are calculated using a modified market-adjusted model: 
ARit = Rit - Rmt 
where Rit is the return on firm i at time t and Rmt is the value-weighted Market Index Return (FT-All 
Share). All acquirers are publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Information 
uncertainty is approached with the proxy of Age (Panel A). The 50% youngest acquirers are classified as 
high information uncertainty, the 50% oldest as low information uncertainty. Age is measured as the 
difference between the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. Size is 
also used as a proxy for information uncertainty (Panel B). The 50% smallest acquirers are classified as 
high information uncertainty and the 50% largest as low information uncertainty. Size is measured as the 
market capitalization (MV) of the acquiring firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. 
Number of Analysts is a third proxy to capture information uncertainty (Panel C), firms followed by 
fewer than 2 analysts, the year prior to the acquisition are classified as high information uncertainty and 
those followed by 2 or more are classified as low information uncertainty. Trading Volume is a fourth 
proxy to capture information uncertainty (Panel D). The 50% less active acquirers are classified as high 
information uncertainty and the 50% most active as low information uncertainty. Trading Volume is 
measured as the average daily trading volume scaled by shares outstanding over the 6 months prior to the 
acquisition announcement date. The lowest 50% R
2
 firms are classified as low synchronicity and the 
highest 50% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity. Deals which simultaneously fall under the High (Low) 
information uncertainty and the Low (High) synchronicity groups are classified as High information 
uncertainty-Low synchronicity, HiuLs (Low information uncertainty-High synchronicity, LiuHs). Each 
Panel illustrates gains to acquirers for private target paid for with stock, for acquisitions for private target 
paid for with cash, for acquisitions for public target paid for with stock and for acquisitions for public 
target paid for with cash. Cash deals are deals financed with 100% cash and stock deals are deals 
financed 100% with stock. The Dif(Hiu-Liu) in each panel represent the difference in mean CARs for 
the five days (-2, +2) around the acquisition announcement between High versus Low uncertainty 
acquirers while the (HiuLs-LiuHs) in each panel represent the difference in mean CARs between High 
uncertainty-Low synchronicity versus Low uncertainty-High synchronicity acquirers. Significance levels 
at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively. P-values are reported in brackets and 
the number of acquisitions for each category is reported below that. 
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Table 5. Multivariate Analysis of CARs on Information Uncertainty, Synchronicity and Deal Characteristics 
  Panel A: Age Panel B: Size 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
High -0.002 
 
0.004   -0.003 
 
0.000 
 
 
(0.724) 
 
(0.426)   (0.630) 
 
(0.959) 
 PrivateStock 0.019 0.019** 
 
  0.021* 0.024** 
  
 
(0.100) (0.030) 
 
  (0.079) (0.013) 
  PrivStock*High 0.024* 
  
  0.020 
   
 
(0.089) 
  
  (0.158) 
   HiuLs 
 
0.002 
 
0.012**   0.004 
 
0.012** 
  
(0.681) 
 
(0.026)   (0.458) 
 
(0.039) 
PrivStock*HiuLs 
 
0.036*** 
 
    0.022* 
  
  
(0.007) 
 
    (0.090) 
  PublicStock 
  
-0.035*** -0.032***   
 
-0.030*** -0.026*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000)   
 
(0.001) (0.006) 
PublicStock*High 
  
-0.026*     
 
-0.036** 
 
   
(0.079)     
 
(0.012) 
 PublicStock*HiuLs 
   
-0.035**   
  
-0.045*** 
    
(0.023)   
  
(0.002) 
MTBV -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) 
Relative Size -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.012*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.808) (0.975) (0.968) (0.956) (0.833) (0.907) (0.956) (0.990) 
Cash-to-Assets -0.028** -0.028** -0.013 -0.014 -0.027** -0.026** -0.014 -0.012 
 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.269) (0.256) (0.028) (0.036) (0.265) (0.335) 
Domestic -0.011** -0.012*** -0.007 -0.008* -0.012** -0.012*** -0.007 -0.008* 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.118) (0.090) (0.010) (0.008) (0.115) (0.083) 
Diversifying -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.737) (0.762) (0.811) (0.867) (0.658) (0.702) (0.793) (0.831) 
_cons 0.083*** 0.076*** 0.097*** 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.071*** 0.105*** 0.085*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 
adj. R-sq 0.036 0.040 0.043 0.045 0.036 0.037 0.045 0.047 
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  Panel C: Analyst Panel D: Volume 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
High 0.002 
 
0.011*   -0.001 
 
0.002 
 
 
(0.764) 
 
(0.055)   (0.918) 
 
(0.681) 
 PrivateStock 0.019* 0.023** 
 
  0.031** 0.028*** 
  
 
(0.077) (0.010) 
 
  (0.017) (0.007) 
  PrivStock*High 0.024* 
  
  0.015 
   
 
(0.081) 
  
  (0.359) 
   HiuLs 
 
0.005 
 
0.017***   0.004 
 
0.009 
  
(0.385) 
 
(0.005)   (0.560) 
 
(0.118) 
PrivStock*HiuLs 
 
0.023* 
 
    0.032** 
  
  
(0.092) 
 
    (0.040) 
  PublicStock 
  
-0.035*** -0.032***   
 
-0.036*** -0.034*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000)   
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
PublicStock*High 
  
-0.033**     
 
-0.031* 
 
   
(0.027)     
 
(0.086) 
 PublicStock*HiuLs 
   
-0.041***   
  
-0.037** 
    
(0.007)   
  
(0.041) 
MTBV -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) 
Relative Size -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.019*** -0.017*** 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.675) (0.809) (0.835) (0.878) (0.869) (0.929) (0.844) (0.949) 
Cash-to-Assets -0.025** -0.025** -0.012 -0.011 -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.024* -0.023* 
 
(0.042) (0.043) (0.342) (0.357) (0.006) (0.006) (0.076) (0.091) 
Domestic -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.007 -0.007* -0.012** -0.012** -0.007 -0.007 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.110) (0.096) (0.022) (0.021) (0.171) (0.145) 
Diversifying -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.459) (0.494) (0.558) (0.570) (0.866) (0.811) (0.922) (0.903) 
_cons 0.067*** 0.063*** 0.078*** 0.074*** 0.107*** 0.097*** 0.127*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1608 1608 1608 1608 1391 1391 1391 1391 
adj. R-sq 0.035 0.036 0.047 0.049 0.048 0.051 0.052 0.054 
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This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer’s five-day cumulative abnormal return controlling for information uncertainty and synchronicity of the 
acquirer’s stock price. The High is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal is classifies as a high information uncertainty one. The HiuLs is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal simultaneously falls under the High information uncertainty and the Low synchronicity groups. 
Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
where ri,j,t is the return of acquirer i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 50% R
2
 firms 
are classified as low synchronicity and the highest 50% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity. For information uncertainty, we employ five proxies. Information 
uncertainty is approached with the proxy of Age (Panel A). The 50% youngest acquirers are classified as high information uncertainty, the 50% oldest as low 
information uncertainty. Age is measured as the difference between the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. Size is also 
used as a proxy for information uncertainty (Panel B). The 50% smallest acquirers are classified as high information uncertainty and the 50% largest as low 
information uncertainty. Size is measured as the market capitalization (MV) of the acquiring firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. Number 
of Analysts is a third proxy to capture information uncertainty (Panel C), firms followed by fewer than 2 analysts, the year prior to the acquisition are 
classified as high information uncertainty and those followed by 2 or more are classified as low information uncertainty. Trading Volume is a fourth proxy to 
capture information uncertainty (Panel D). The 50% less active acquirers are classified as high information uncertainty and the 50% most active as low 
information uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured as the average daily trading volume scaled by shares outstanding over the 6 months prior to the 
acquisition announcement date. PrivateStock is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer announces the acquisition of private target firm and 
the acquisition is financed with equity.  PublicStock is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer announces the acquisition of public target 
firm and the acquisition is financed with equity. Acquirer’s market-to-book is measured by the acquirer’s market value a month before the announcement of 
the deal divided by its net book value of assets; a deal’s relative size is the ratio between target and acquirer size; the Log(Total Assets) is the logarithmic of 
acquirers total assets the year prior to the acquisition announcement; Leverage is measured as acquirer’s long term debt divided by the market value of equity 
the year prior to the acquisition announcement; Cash-to-Assets is measures as acquirer’s cash prior to the year of the announcement scaled by its total assets; 
domestic deals dummy takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of UK firms and zero otherwise; diversifying deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the 
acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ***, ** and *, 
respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Table 6. Multivariate Analysis of CARs on Information Uncertainty, Synchronicity after controlled for Disclosure and Deal Characteristics 
 
Panel A: Age Panel B: Size Panel C: Analyst Panel D: Volume 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PrivateStock 0.018** 
 
0.024*** 
 
0.022*** 
 
0.023** 
 
 
0.030** 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.008*** 
 
0.019** 
 PublicStock 
 
-0.033*** 
 
-0.030*** 
 
-0.033*** 
 
-0.036*** 
  
0.000*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.001*** 
HiuLs 0.003 0.013** 0.005 0.012** 0.007 0.020*** 0.005 0.012** 
 
0.645 0.015** 0.356 0.026** 0.268 0.002*** 0.387 0.038** 
PrivStock*HiuLs 0.047*** 
 
0.027** 
 
0.031** 
 
0.057*** 
 
 
0.001*** 
 
0.043** 
 
0.028** 
 
0.001*** 
 PublicStock*HiuLs 
 
-0.039** 
 
-0.041*** 
 
-0.048*** 
 
-0.036* 
  
0.017** 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.056* 
MTBV -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 
0.006*** 0.011** 0.018** 0.024** 0.022** 0.023** 0.010*** 0.014** 
Relative Size -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 
Log(Total Assets) -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.017*** 
 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.970 0.950 0.894 0.986 0.802 0.878 0.943 0.980 
Cash-to-Assets -0.025** -0.012 -0.023* -0.009 -0.023* -0.010 -0.033** -0.020 
 
0.040** 0.328 0.059* 0.440 0.062* 0.420 0.016** 0.145 
Domestic -0.012*** -0.008* -0.012*** -0.008* -0.012*** -0.007* -0.012** -0.007 
 
0.006*** 0.090* 0.007*** 0.092* 0.007*** 0.100* 0.017** 0.143 
Diversifying -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
 
0.745 0.905 0.689 0.845 0.455 0.564 0.790 0.931 
_cons 0.077*** 0.091*** 0.071*** 0.085*** 0.062*** 0.075*** 0.093*** 0.113*** 
 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
N 1673 1673 1673 1673 1608 1608 1391 1391 
adj. R-sq 0.043 0.046 0.039 0.046 0.038 0.051 0.058 0.054 
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This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer’s five-day cumulative abnormal return controlling for information uncertainty and synchronicity of the 
acquirer’s stock price. The HiuLs is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal simultaneously falls under the High information uncertainty and 
the Low synchronicity groups. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
where ri,j,t is the return of acquirer i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. Synchronicity is further 
controlled for disclosure. Disclosure is calculated as described in section 4.3. Synchronicity is regressed on disclosure: 
Synchronicityi = αi + βι Disclosure + εi 
The residuals (εi) is used a measure of private information. The lowest 50% of the residuals are classified as low synchronicity and the highest 50% of the 
residuals as high synchronicity. For information uncertainty, we employ five proxies. Information uncertainty is approached with the proxy of Age (Panel A). 
The 50% youngest acquirers are classified as high information uncertainty, the 50% oldest as low information uncertainty. Age is measured as the difference 
between the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. Size is also used as a proxy for information uncertainty (Panel B). The 
50% smallest acquirers are classified as high information uncertainty and the 50% largest as low information uncertainty. Size is measured as the market 
capitalization (MV) of the acquiring firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. Number of Analysts is a third proxy to capture information 
uncertainty (Panel C), firms followed by fewer than 2 analysts, the year prior to the acquisition are classified as high information uncertainty and those 
followed by 2 or more are classified as low information uncertainty. Trading Volume is a fourth proxy to capture information uncertainty (Panel D). The 50% 
less active acquirers are classified as high information uncertainty and the 50% most active as low information uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured as 
the average daily trading volume scaled by shares outstanding over the 6 months prior to the acquisition announcement date. PrivateStock is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer announces the acquisition of private target firm and the acquisition is financed with equity.  PublicStock is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer announces the acquisition of public target firm and the acquisition is financed with equity. Acquirer’s 
market-to-book is measured by the acquirer’s market value a month before the announcement of the deal divided by its net book value of assets; a deal’s 
relative size is the ratio between target and acquirer size; the Log(Total Assets) is the logarithmic of acquirers total assets the year prior to the acquisition 
announcement; Leverage is measured as acquirer’s long term debt divided by the market value of equity the year prior to the acquisition announcement; 
Cash-to-Assets is measures as acquirer’s cash prior to the year of the announcement scaled by its total assets; domestic deals dummy takes the value of 1 for 
acquisitions of UK firms and zero otherwise; diversifying deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from 
that of the target and 0 otherwise. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ***, ** and *, respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. 
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Table 7. Multivariate Analysis of 48 months Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) on Information Uncertainty, Synchronicity and Deal Characteristics 
 
Panel A: Age Panel B: Size Panel C: Analysts Panel D: Volume 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
) HiuLs 0.119** 0.106** 0.095* 0.099* 0.011 -0.038 -0.04 -0.019 
 
(0.019) (0.035) (0.079) (0.064) (0.862) (0.529) (0.446) (0.709) 
PrivateStock -0.253***  -0.282***  -0.238***  -0.328***  
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.000)  
PrivateStock*HiuLs -0.039**  -0.036*  -0.055*  0.001  
 
(0.045)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.997)  
PublicStock  -0.161*  -0.154*  -0.257***  -0.106 
 
 (0.058)  (0.082)  (0.003)  (0.263) 
PublicStock*HiuLs  0.022*  0.006*  0.264*  0.090 
 
 (0.088)  (0.067)  (0.082)  (0.565) 
MTBV -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.036) (0.015) 
Relative Size -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.630) (0.402) (0.600) (0.393) (0.563) (0.371) (0.721) (0.399) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.145*** 0.167*** 0.156*** 0.178*** 0.117*** 0.136*** 0.118*** 0.151*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.083) (0.135) (0.086) (0.148) (0.079) (0.134) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash-to-Assets 0.053 -0.003 0.079 0.027 0.083 0.032 0.061 -0.004 
 
(0.647) (0.980) (0.493) (0.810) (0.500) (0.791) (0.606) (0.970) 
Domestic 0.090** 0.106** 0.091** 0.106** 0.090** 0.109** 0.069 0.079* 
 
(0.034) (0.015) (0.032) (0.014) (0.040) (0.014) (0.109) (0.073) 
Diversifying -0.021 -0.033 -0.030 -0.040 -0.036 -0.046 -0.030 -0.041 
 
(0.591) (0.405) (0.452) (0.310) (0.381) (0.259) (0.466) (0.320) 
Constant -1.007*** -1.121*** -1.063*** -1.186*** -0.821*** -0.917*** -0.826*** -1.012*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1672 1672 1672 1672 1607 1607 1390 1390 
adj. R-sq 0.045 0.038 0.044 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.06 0.048 
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This table presents regression estimates of the acquirer’s Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) controlling for information uncertainty and 
synchronicity of the acquirer’s stock price. The BHAR for company i is computed as: 
 
where Rit is the monthly return for company i, and Rmt is the monthly return of the market index. 
 
The HiuLs is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal simultaneously fall under the High (Low) information uncertainty and the Low (High) 
synchronicity groups. Synchronicity is measured as the R
2
 of the following regression: 
ri,j,t= βi,0 + βi,m rm,t + βi,j rj,t +εi,t 
where ri,j,t is the return of acquirer i in industry j at time t, rm,t is the market return at time t and rj,t is the return of industry j at time t. The lowest 50% R
2
 firms 
are classified as low synchronicity and the highest 50% R
2
 firms as high synchronicity. For information uncertainty, we employ five proxies. Information 
uncertainty is approached with the proxy of Age (Panel A). The 50% youngest acquirers are classified as high information uncertainty, the 50% oldest as low 
information uncertainty. Age is measured as the difference between the incorporation date of the firm until the announcement date of the deal. Size is also 
used as a proxy for information uncertainty (Panel B). The 50% smallest acquirers are classified as high information uncertainty and the 50% largest as low 
information uncertainty. Size is measured as the market capitalization (MV) of the acquiring firm 20 days before the announcement date of the deal. Number 
of Analysts is a third proxy to capture information uncertainty (Panel C), firms followed by fewer than 2 analysts, the year prior to the acquisition are 
classified as high information uncertainty and those followed by 2 or more are classified as low information uncertainty. Trading Volume is a fourth proxy to 
capture information uncertainty (Panel D). The 50% less active acquirers are classified as high information uncertainty and the 50% most active as low 
information uncertainty. Trading Volume is measured as the average daily trading volume scaled by shares outstanding over the 6 months prior to the 
acquisition announcement date. PrivateStock is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer announces the acquisition of private target firm and 
the acquisition is financed with equity.  PublicStock is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer announces the acquisition of public target 
firm and the acquisition is financed with equity. Acquirer’s market-to-book is measured by the acquirer’s market value a month before the announcement of 
the deal divided by its net book value of assets; a deal’s relative size is the ratio between target and acquirer size; the Log(Total Assets) is the logarithmic of 
acquirers total assets the year prior to the acquisition announcement; Leverage is measured as acquirer’s long term debt divided by the market value of equity 
the year prior to the acquisition announcement; Cash-to-Assets is measures as acquirer’s cash prior to the year of the announcement scaled by its total assets; 
domestic deals dummy takes the value of 1 for acquisitions of UK firms and zero otherwise; diversifying deals is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the 
acquirer’s two-digit SIC code is different from that of the target and 0 otherwise. Significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% are represented by ***, ** and *, 
respectively. P-values are reported in brackets. 
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